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FROM APPROPRIATE EMOTIONS TO VALUES* 
§ 1 INTRODUCTION 
There are at least three well-known accounts of value and evalua-
tions which assign a central role to emotions. There is first of all the 
emotivist view, according to which evaluations express or manifest 
emotional states or attitudes but have no truth values. Second is the dis-
positionalist view, according to which to possess a value or axiological 
property is to be capable of provoking or to be likely to provoke emotional 
responses in subjects characterised in certain ways. Third, there is an epis-
temology of values that is sometimes invoked by the naive realist. If the 
naive realist is one for whom evaluations are made true by the possession 
by objects of monadic, mind-independent axiological properties, then one 
natural question is: What sort of cognitive access do we have to such 
properties? These value properties, the realist may say, are properties we 
come to know of by virtue of our emotions. Emotions, he may say, present 
value properties to us. One variant of this view is the claim that values are 
the "formal objects" of emotions. Closely related to these claims is the 
view that our emotions are appropriate to value properties, or not. Indig-
nation and injustice, it is sometimes said, are related in one or more of 
these three ways.1 
In what follows I sketch a fourth account of evaluations and values 
which employs a notion central to the dispositionalist theory, that of possible 
emotional responses, and a notion central to the epistemology of the naive 
realist, the category of (in)appropriate emotional responses. The account 
to be given is cognitivist, like the second and third account and unlike the 
first, emotivist, account. But, unlike the dispositionalist account, it does 
not reduce value properties to natural properties; nor does it wholly 
analyse the former in terms of the latter. Unlike the epistemology and 
semantics of the naive realist, the account to be given does not allow for 
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monadic mind-independent axiological properties. Emotions, I shall suggest, 
are indeed sometimes appropriate and sometimes inappropriate. But they 
are, in the first place, appropriate or inappropriate to natural objects and 
processes and to the natural properties and features of natural objects. 
Emotions are not, to begin with, appropriate responses to values. For to be 
valuable is just for certain emotional responses to be appropriate. Appro-
priateness, I shall suggest, is to be understood in terms of justification. 
Emotions are justified by perceptions, memories and non-axiological beliefs. 
They also justify axiological beliefs. 
I first introduce some of the distinctions, notions and theses to be 
employed in the analysis, at some length (§ 2). I then formulate the analysis 
in two steps, by saying something about what it is to master an evaluative 
concept (§ 3), and by giving an account of the truth-conditions of one 
central type of evaluation (§ 4). I consider some objections to the account 
(§ 5), in particular the objection that it is circular, since the concepts of 
appropriateness and justification employed are themselves evaluative 
concepts. Finally, I consider some advantages of the analysis and some 
possible developments, in particular its relations to response-dependence 
theories and to verificationisms, both realist and anti-realist (§ 6). 
§ 2 PRESUPPOSITIONS: EMOTIONS, VALUES, JUSTIFICATION 
Emotions 
What are emotions? I shall assume, I hope uncontroversially, that 
within the varied class of episodic affective phenomena there is a stable 
four-way distinction between (1) drives or instincts such as hunger, (2) 
sensations or feelings, such as a pain in my left foot, (3) moods, such as 
certain forms of anxiety or jubilation, and (4) emotions. Drives and sen-
sations or feelings require no cognitive bases. Moods may be considered 
to require no cognitive bases or, alternatively, to require only very inde-
terminate bases, or indeed to be simply non-localised sensations. Emotions, 
however, require more or less determinate cognitive bases such as per-
ceptions, memories, anticipations and occurrent beliefs. If Sam regrets his 
impolite behaviour yesterday, his episodic emotion is based on his memory 
or belief that he behaved impolitely. I assume that the most basic types of 
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memory and perception are non-propositional and that some emotions are 
based on such non-propositional cognitive states. Whereas regret requires 
a propositional object, admiration need not. Sam's admiration of Maria's 
gait may simply be based on his perception of the way she moves. 
Feelings, emotions and moods are all episodes or occurrences. They 
may be distinguished from sentiments—those deeply rooted dispositions 
the manifestations of which are emotions and other types of affective 
states. A sentiment, such as hatred of Continental philosophy, is often 
called a motive. To say that someone acts out of or from vanity or hatred 
of Continental philosophy is to attribute to him a sentiment or motive. 
Sentiments come in all shapes and sizes. They have at least the variety of 
episodic emotions since any such emotion corresponds in principle to a 
possible sentiment. But since every sentiment manifests itself in a variety 
of different ways, the multiplicity of sentiments is greater than that of 
emotions. The love of the nationalist for the nation he persists in personi-
fying is a sentiment. A person's affective relation to exemplars, leaders, 
role models and (anti-)heroes is a type of sentiment. So, too, is his relation 
to the interiorised exemplars and models we call self-images. 
Affective phenomena and sentiments are, it is safe to say, to be dis-
tinguished from intentions, wantings and volitions. The cognitive bases of 
the latter are propositionally structured, future-oriented and bear on possible 
actions. Emotions, in contrast, need not have propositional bases, are 
often directed towards the past, and need not bear directly on action or 
behaviour. Episodic preferrings, for example, like preferences, their dis-
positional counterparts, may bear on objects, states of affairs or options, 
and these may lie in the past or in the future. Whether or not we think that 
it is better (more rational) to live according to the principle of sunk costs 
it is a fact that many of our emotions are directed towards the past. 
Finally, it is plausible to claim that intentions and wantings presup-
pose emotions and sentiments provided these are allowed to embrace such 
"cool" sentiments as what psychologists call "concern" (Bedeutungsge-
fiihle). For emotions and sentiments fix the range of variation of a subject's 
intentions and wantings and so, too, of his behaviour. Other things being 
equal, Barry's hatred of Continental Philosophy is more likely to manifest 
itself in the desire to do it down, criticise or hinder it than in the desire to 
award its proponents honorary doctorates or to build bridges. 
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Evaluations 
What is an evaluation? In what follows I shall have in mind truth-
bearers or predications which are contingently true or false and which 
employ a thin evaluative predicate such as "good," "bad," "worse than," 
"better than" or any of the numerous predicates the applicability of which 
entails, other things being equal, that one of the thin axiological predicates 
applies (on other types of evaluation, see § 6 below). Examples of predi-
cates entailing thin axiological predicates are: "cowardly," "elegant," 
"courageous," "generous," "beastly," "priggish" and "shoddy." The corre-
sponding thick axiological concepts stand in sharp contrast to the most 
basic type of normative concepts such as those expressed by "ought" and 
"may." These latter expressions, I shall assume, take action-predicates to 
form new predicates. They are about doables and tell us what ought (not) 
to be done. 
A first contrast between axiological predicates and such normative 
expressions can be formulated as follows: that whereas the former family 
contains the relational predicates " better than " and " worse 
than " there is no corresponding relational, normative predicate in 
ordinary language. In particular, there is no such thing as a comparative 
ought-to-do. Were there such comparative oughts in the legal domain, 
then the legal system would be unwieldy. There are, it is true, predications 
of the form "My promise to F is more binding than my promise to G." But 
"is more binding than" is not the relational counterpart of "ought," as can 
be seen by comparing their terms. A second contrast emerges if we 
consider the presence in the axiological family of both thin predicates 
such as "good" and the large and varied class of thick axiological predi-
cates such as "cowardly" and "kitsch" that entail one of the thin 
predicates. The family of concepts to which belong the concepts of what 
ought to be done and of what may be done contains only thin concepts. To 
be kitsch or sentimental is, other things being equal, to be a bad thing 
(whatever other axiological properties the object that is kitsch or senti-
mental has). This may be due to the fact that "kitsch" stands to "bad," and 
"courageous" to "good," as does "red" to "coloured," that is to say, as de-
terminate to determinable. But this is only one, albeit perhaps the simplest, 
way of understanding such entailments. In any case, there do not seem to 
be any lower-order normative properties which entail thin normative prop-
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erties in anything like the same way. If we assume that thick axiological 
properties are determinates of thin axiological properties, then the point 
might be made by saying that there are no determinate normative proper-
ties. The only qualification that needs to be made here is that there are 
indeed ethical, moral, cognitive, aesthetic, technical, prudential and economic 
oughts. But it is obvious that the resultant tree of normative concepts 
exhibits a branching structure which is very much less complex than that 
exhibited by axiological properties. 
A third and final contrast between axiological and normative proper-
ties emerges if we consider the relations each family of properties has to 
natural properties. Since the account of value to be given is not a natural-
istic account, I shall assume that no axiological property can be identified 
with any bundle of natural properties. But it is quite plausible to assume 
that possession of some thick axiological property entails possession of 
certain determinate natural properties. To be courageous is, amongst other 
things, to know fear and overcome it. One type of injustice involves 
behaviour which can be characterised as treating people who are rele-
vantly similar and in relevantly similar contexts in different ways. To be 
unfree is, amongst other things, to be constrained. And the different types 
of constraint can be characterised in natural terms. For abortion to be 
good, bad or ethically indifferent it must be identifiable in natural terms. 
The vice of ressentiment can be characterised in large measure in terms of 
a complex psychological description. 
Do predications about what ought (not) to be done entail predications 
of natural properties? If Sam ought to do a certain deed then it must be 
within his power or he must believe that this is the case. But apart from 
this entailment there seems to be nothing in the normative sphere that is 
comparable to the varied entailments from thick axiological properties to 
natural properties. Nevertheless, there is one important type of link 
between normative predications and natural properties. There are predica-
tions which justify—even if they do not entail—normative predications. 
We ought not to drive fast on the Autobahn because human life is 
valuable. But here the property being appealed to is precisely an axiolog-
ical property. If normative predications which are justifiable are justifiable 
in the first instance by reference to axiological claims, and if the posses-
sion of natural properties is relevant to justifying axiological claims, then 
normative predications do indeed link up with the natural world. But only 
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indirectly, only via values, and the link is that of justification not that of 
entailment. Thick axiological properties, on the other hand, link up 
directly with natural properties. 
It will be apparent that the assumptions so far introduced about 
emotions and values, on the one hand, and about intentions or wantings 
and norms, on the other hand, are made for one another. Emotions and 
sentiments stand to intentions as do values to norms. Just as our emotions 
and sentiments prescribe the range of our desires and intentions, so, too, 
our evaluations fix the range of normative claims we endorse. But we can 
as little read off directly a man's desires from his sentiments as we can 
read off the normative claims he endorses from a knowledge of his values. 
Emotions are more basic than desires, values are more basic than norms; 
emotions are not desires, values are not norms. Similarly, it seems plausible 
to assume that the accounts given of emotions and of thick values are made 
for one another. Our access to the natural properties presupposed by thick 
axiological properties involves just those perceptions, memories and non-
evaluative beliefs which can serve as the cognitive bases of our emotions. 
Prima Facie Non-inductive Justification 
At the heart of the account to be given in §§ 3-4 lies a type of justi-
fication which is defeasible, non-inductive and, in certain important cases, 
non-doxastic and non-propositional. Although it is widely accepted that 
there is defeasible, non-inductive justification, it has seemed to many 
philosophers, from Kant to Davidson and McDowell, that the relation of 
justification must connect only items that are truth-bearers (sentences, 
propositions, beliefs, judgements etc.). This is not the place to argue that 
this assumption is wrong. But it is important to say something about just 
what the appeal to non-propositional justification involves and about its 
extension to cases where what justifies or is justified is neither proposi-
tional nor doxastic.2 
Suppose that Sam sees a large, salivating dog, its hairs standing on 
end, baring its teeth and moving towards him rapidly. I assume that simple 
seeing of things, their features, events, is to be distinguished from seeing 
that things possess certain features. Seeing that involves beliefs and 
concepts, simple seeing involves neither. If Sam forms a belief to the 
effect that a large, salivating dog is baring its teeth and moving towards 
him rapidly and if he forms this belief on the basis of his perceptual ex-
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periences (and not, say, on the basis of testimony) then the following cases 
can be distinguished. 
First, Sam's perceptual experiences are veridical: there is a large, 
salivating . . . dog in his visual field and it, its traits and the events bound 
up with these are visually differentiated for him. His belief is true. Not 
only does he see a large, salivating (etc.) dog but he sees the dog as a dog, 
he sees it as salivating, moving rapidly towards him, and so on. Some 
philosophers assume that seeing as necessarily involves conceptualisa-
tion. I do not. I shall assume that in the present case Sam enjoys a rich 
non-conceptual perceptual content. 
Secondly, it may be the case that Sam's perceptual experiences are 
not veridical. There is no creature in his visual field. But it is with Sam as 
though he were seeing a dog which is salivating, moving rapidly towards 
him, and so on. 
Thirdly, there are clearly a number of possible intermediate cases. 
For example, the case where what Sam sees as a dog which is salivating and 
moving towards him is in reality a fox which is salivating, moving rapidly 
towards him, and so on. 
I shall say that in the second case Sam's perceptual experience, 
which is a hallucination, prima facie justifies his belief, which is false. 
Sam's belief in the first case is of course also justified. The type of justi-
fication involved links Sam's perceptual experience and his belief. The 
former is not propositional, the latter is. Similarly, I shall say that Sam's 
experience as of rain justifies his belief that it is raining. The type of jus-
tification involved is defeasible. If Sam becomes aware that a film-crew is 
watering the area he is looking at as part of a film, this will defeat the 
initial justification. Finally, the sort of justification involved is not inductive. 
In the two situations I have introduced Sam does not form the belief that 
it is very likely that it is raining or that it is very likely that a salivating 
dog is moving towards him. Although he might have done. 
It will be useful to have a term to describe the difference between (a) 
the case where Sam's perceptual experience as of a large, salivating dog 
is a perception of a large, salivating dog and (b) the case where it is not. 
Since, by hypothesis, Sam's experience is not a belief, we cannot distin-
guish between the two cases in terms of true and false beliefs. I shall say 
that in case (a) Sam's experience/ite its object. Perception of a real duck 
as a duck, unlike perception of a real duck as a rabbit, is perception which 
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fits its object. Fit, then, as I shall here understand it, presupposes veridi-
cality. 
Justified Fear 
Suppose, now, that Sam, on the basis of his fitting and hence veridical 
perception of the dog, feels fear. We said that emotions require bases. There 
are at least three possible bases for Sam's fear. 
(1) Sam feels fear on the basis of his perception of a large, salivating 
dog which he sees as a large, salivating dog (veridicality, fit). 
(2) Sam feels fear on the basis of his belief that a large salivating dog 
is moving towards him, a belief that is based in its turn on his veridical 
and fitting perceptions (truth, veridicality, fit). 
(3) Sam feels fear on the basis of his belief that a dangerous, large 
dog is moving towards him, a belief that is based on his belief that a large, 
salivating dog is moving towards him, which in its turn is based on his 
veridical and fitting perceptions (truth, veridicality, fit). 
In (2) and (3) the immediate basis of Sam's fear is a belief, whereas in (1) 
the basis is a perceptual content. In (3) Sam's belief contains a thick axi-
ological predicate, "dangerous" whereas his belief in (2) bears only on 
purely natural properties of the dog; it is a non-axiological belief. 
Enemies of non-conceptual perceptual content assimilate (1) to (2). 
Many philosophers writing about the bases of emotions claim that Sam's 
fear must be based on a belief that contains an axiological concept, for 
example the concept of danger. I suggest that all three cases, (l)-(3), 
occur. That emotions can be based on axiological beliefs—pity for victims 
of canine phobia, sadness due to a tragedy—is uncontroversial. I reject the 
assimilation of (1) to belief of any kind. A common argument in favour of 
such an assimilation goes as follows: "It is not Sam's perceptual experi-
ence as of a large, salivating dog that justifies his belief. Perception, if it 
is not propositional, cannot justify anything, does not belong to the space 
of reasons. If anything justifies Sam's belief it is his beliefs about the way 
things look." The argument confuses dispositions and episodes. It is un-
controversial that, if challenged about his belief, Sam might respond by 
pointing and saying "That looks like a large, salivating dog." But it does 
not follow from this innocuous observation about Sam's ability to do this 
that Sam cannot move, in a perfectly, rational and eminently comprehen-
sible way, from his perception as of a large dog to his belief. 
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I shall assume that Sam's perception as of a large, salivating . . . dog 
justifies his fear. Since neither of the two terms of the justification relation 
here is prepositional, and since many philosophers believe that where 
there is justification then at the very least that which is justified must be 
prepositional, it is perhaps preferable to introduce the cognate term 'mo-
tivation' for the relation between Sam's perceptual content and his fear. 
Sam's perceptual content, we might then say, motivates his fear. The per-
ceptual content may be wholly delusory. Sam's fear may not be fear of 
anything at all. The situation resembles that in which Sam's delusory per-
ception as of rain justifies his belief that it is raining. The main difference 
is that in the latter case Sam's perceptual experience justifies his belief. In 
the former case his perceptual experience motivates his emotion. 
The view that non-conceptual perceptual content can motivate affective 
responses will be rejected both by those who doubt the existence of the 
former and by those who find the notion of non-prepositional justification 
incoherent. As far as the doubt is concerned, it is worth noting the 
existence of psychological studies which distinguish and investigate 
emotional responses based on perceptual and those based on reflective 
processes, for example in certain types of amnesia and in cases of 
Alzheimer's disease.3 One source of the doubt is the undeniable fact that, 
for many emotions, for example, fear, both a prepositional and a non-
prepositional base are possible. But this is not always the case. Disgust 
and enjoyment are normally bound up with sensory states. Indeed disgust 
seems to be primarily bound up with visual and tactile experience, rather 
than, say, auditory experience. 
Although some versions of the analysis to be given (in §§ 3-4) will 
survive rejection of non-conceptual perceptual content, the view that 
emotions can be based on perception and that such perception is not 
always concept-involving provides the most plausible way of shaking the 
widespread conviction that emotions are always based on beliefs with ax-
iological content. 
Just as determinate types of perceptual experience justify some per-
ceptual judgements and fail to justify others, so too determinate types of 
perceptual experience and determinate types of non-axiological belief 
motivate some emotions and fail to motivate others. Just as perception as 
of clear skies does not justify the belief that it is raining but rather beliefs 
incompatible with this, so too perception as of small, distant dogs on 
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leashes does not, by itself, motivate fear. Some types of perceptual expe-
rience can defeat prima facie motivations. 
If perceptual experience justifies perceptual belies, if emotions are 
motivated by perceptual experience and by non-axiological beliefs, what 
justifies axiological beliefs? 
Justified Axiological Beliefs 
Suppose Sam believes that the dog is dangerous. What if anything 
justifies this? Sam's belief that the dog is dangerous is justified by his fear 
provided this fear satisfies certain conditions. Suppose Sam's fear is per-
ception-based. Then his fear justifies his belief that the dog is dangerous 
if it is motivated, for example, by perception as of a large, salivating . . . 
dog or by other easily imaginable perceptions of this type. The task of de-
termining just which types of perceptual content motivate which types of 
emotion is, of course, not an easy one. Suppose Sam's fear is based on a 
non-axiological belief. Then the relevant types of conceptual content will 
be more or less loosely tied to perception; they may involve a lot of back-
ground knowledge and inferences, for example. The claim that emotions 
—both those based on perception and memory, and those based on non-
axiological beliefs—justify evaluations is without any doubt the most 
controversial of the extensions of the scope of the relation of defeasible, 
non-inductive justification introduced here. Not only does it run counter 
to the prevailing assumptions already mentioned about the possible terms 
of the relation of justification, it is incompatible with the widespread view 
that the base of every emotion must contain an evaluative predicate. On 
this view, only what is conceived of as being dangerous or as possessing 
some other negative value property can be feared, only what is believed 
to be admirable can be admired. Many of the arguments against this view 
are analogues of the arguments against the claim that to see is always to 
judge and apply concepts. 
Thus the view often enjoys a certain plausibility in virtue of failing 
to distinguish between the occurrence of judgements to the effect that 
something is dangerous and the ability to apply such an evaluative 
concept. I here assume only that emotional responses can occur on the 
basis of perceptions and non-axiological judgements. It may well be true 
that many of the more sophisticated emotional responses could not occur 
in subjects who did not already master a variety of evaluative predicates. 
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In the same way, it seems highly likely that certain types of perceptual 
content could only be enjoyed by subjects who already master certain con-
ceptual capacities. From this it does not follow that enjoyment of these 
types of emotional experience or perceptual content must involve actual-
isation of these capacities. 
The view is also implausible as an account of the emotions of young 
children and fails to do justice to emotions which are regularly based on 
perception and on non-axiological beliefs. An example of the former is the 
already mentioned emotion of disgust, based, for example, on the percep-
tion of dirt. An example of the latter is provided by irritation provoked by 
the discovery that someone likes Continental Philosophy. 
The view that emotions are inseparable from evaluations is often 
presented as a claim about the identifiability of emotions: an emotion is 
what it is in large measure because of the evaluations with which it is 
bound up. More generally, it is often claimed that an emotion is what it is 
in large measure because of the bases with which it is bound up. On such 
views, what is qualitatively distinctive about emotions, once their bases 
have been identified, are the different types of emotional sensations they 
involve. Against these assumptions, I shall assume that there are qualita-
tively distinct types of emotional experience which can be distinguished 
relatively independently of their bases. This view of emotions is perhaps 
most plausible for emotions such as maternal love, erotic jealousy, ressen-
timent, grief, and disgust. 
If the least controversial candidate for the role of terms of the relation 
of defeasible, non-inductive justification is provided by belief-couples, 
then the four extensions of the scope of this relation introduced here all 
involve at least one non-doxastic and concept-free term. In order of in-
creasing controversy value they are: 
perceptual content justifies non-axiological belief; 
perceptual content justifies emotions; 
non-axiological belief justifies emotions; 
emotions justify axiological beliefs. 
A fifth, related, case is provided by the relation of justification between a 
motive or sentiment and an intention, as when Barry's hatred of Conti-
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nental Philosophy motivates his intention to write a letter to The Times. A 
sixth case, by the relation between this intention and the writing of the letter. 
§ 3 VALUE CONCEPTS 
What is involved in mastering axiological concepts? A full answer to 
this question involves giving an account of the semantics of evaluations. 
But we may begin by briefly leaving semantics aside. There is a view 
about the individuation of many natural, ordinary-language predicates 
which can profitably be extended here, provided the presuppositions 
already introduced are accepted. 
According to this view, to master the meaning of a predicate like 
'tree' (but not, for example, 'politician') is to master two things. First, it 
is to master a number of combinatorial and inferential properties of the 
predicate. Second, it is to master a large, open-ended class of possible 
transitions from different types of perceptual experience to uses of the 
predicate. The transitions in question must all have the property that the 
experiences furnish prima facie justifications for the predications 
employing the predicate. Since (dispositional) grasp of what justifies ap-
plication of a predicate also involves some grasp of what defeats such 
justifications, the latter, too, contributes to mastery of the predicate. 
It is obvious enough how such an account might be extended to 
provide an account of our grasp of axiological predicates, if we bear in 
mind the extensions of the notion of a prima facie justification in § 2. Here 
the crucial type of experience will be emotional. To understand an axio-
logical predicate is to be familiar with the range of emotional experience 
which stands in relations of prima facie justification to uses of the 
predicate. Of course, the situation in the case of axiological predicates is 
much more complex than in the case of simple natural predicates. First, 
because the account of the meaning of axiological predicates may be 
thought to presuppose the account given of natural predicates, in addition 
to being modelled on it. Many types of emotional experience have per-
ceptions as their cognitive bases. Thus both these bases and these emotions 
will belong to the relevant classes of justifiers. Second, as already noted, 
to understand thick axiological predicates involves grasping the connex-
ions between these and certain natural properties. 
A slightly less ambitious version of this account remains open to the 
foe of non-conceptual perceptual content: the mastery of evaluative pred-
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icates still involves mastering the transitions from emotions to such pred-
icates, he may say. But the relevant bases will be provided only by non-
axiological beliefs. 
On the assumption that some such account is possible, we may 
wonder what its scope could be. At this point we run into the multiplicity 
problem: how do the different types of emotion match up with the different 
types of evaluative predicate? 
The different types of link between emotions and axiological predi-
cates fall into four distinct categories: one-one, one-many, and many-one 
and many-many correspondences. The first such category has tended to 
dominate philosophical discussion. The epistemology of naive realism 
about values alludes to this category when it says of some emotion that it 
presents or has as its formal object this or that determinate-value property 
and that this or that value property can only be presented by this or that 
emotion. 
The most familiar example is provided by the relation between the 
emotion or sentiment of approbation and goodness. But this venerable 
example resembles a philosophical artefact more than anything else. 
Approval and approbation are attitudes indicated by the speech act of 
commending. They do not seem to be emotions, although they are perhaps 
invariably connected with positive emotions (which are also perhaps 
indicated by the act of commending). If we try to specify the emotion 
which has the goodness of an act or object as its object we immediately 
run into difficulties, one symptom of which is the frequent reference in the 
literature to "a pro-attitude." The emotions of pleasure or of liking are 
plausible in certain cases. Good wines and good food please. But does the 
goodness of an heroic act, of a woman struggling against the onset of 
cancer, please? A more traditional candidate is the love-"good" pair. But 
the proper, natural object of love is a person. Not wine or food, not even 
Chateau Margaux or Irish oysters. And if it is true that love of a person, 
as opposed to admiration of a person (or indeed as opposed to any other 
emotion directed towards a person), is not love in virtue of this or that 
property of a person, then love turns out to be completely unsuitable to 
play the role of the justifier for uses of the predicate "good." (It is worth 
noting that the difficulty of specifying the emotion which corresponds to 
goodness may well be the source of the idea, alluded to above, that ap-
probation cannot be identified except by its association with the thought 
that something is good.4) 
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Curiously, there is no such problem in the case of the relational coun-
terpart of "good," "better than," which provides us with our second 
possible case of a one-one correspondence. Both episodic preferring and 
its dispositional counterpart, the sentiment called "preference," justify 
predications containing the predicate "better than." An equally plausible 
candidate for one-one emotion-predicate links is provided by the next 
case, which comprehends a vast number of transitions. 
Perhaps the simplest type of emotion-value correlation is provided by 
couples of emotions and what Christine Tappolet (1996) calls "affective 
values" such as disgust-disgusting, bore-boring, fear-fearful. These three 
axiological predicates might be taken to mean "regularly provokes 
disgust, boredom or fear." But couples such as admire-admirable, prefer-
preferable, hate-hateful, contempt-contemptible, despise-despicable, 
enjoy-enjoyable, abominate-abominable, detest-detestable and—a favourite 
of Bertrand Russell's—love-loveable, do not allow of such an interpreta-
tion. For something to be admirable is not, or not just, for it to be such that 
it does, could, or would provoke admiration. For something to be prefer-
able to something else is not, or not just, for it to be such that it is, could, 
or would be preferred. To be admirable is to be such that admiration 
would be justified. For one option to be preferable to another is for pref-
erence of the one over the other to be justified. Indeed if we assume that 
to be better than just is to be preferable to, then our second example of a 
one-one link, prefer-better, turns out to belong here. It is perhaps because 
to be preferable to is to be better than that the behaviour of "better" differs 
from that of "good" in the way already noted. 
To grasp what it is for something to be "F-able" (for example, 
"admirable"), where "F" is used to ascribe an emotion (for example, ad-
miration), is often to master the justificatory transition from the emotion 
mentioned to application of the predicate. But, of course, since each 
emotion of the right type is associated with a large number of heteroge-
nous bases, perceptual and doxastic, familiarity with these is also required 
for someone to master the predicate. 
There are a number of other more or less plausible examples of one-
one connections. The hideous horrifies, the comic amuses, ugliness displeases, 
the sublime amazes or astonishes and terrifies, gaffes embarrass and so on. 
But although there are many plausible one-one connections between emotions 
and axiological predicates, there are also one-many, many-one and many-
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many correlations. And the task of distinguishing between these is more 
than a merely lexiographical task. 
Is indignation not as appropriate to injustice as to certain forms of 
cruelty? Michael Kohlhaas's reaction to injustice was acute pain. Rechts-
gefuhl is not just one emotion. Is admiration not appropriate to many 
virtues? What negative attitude is appropriate to ressentiment! Suppose 
that consistency, avoidance of contradiction or knowledge are cognitive 
values. What emotions, if any, are appropriate to these? Respect? Love? 
Admiration? Misuses of language and linguistic rule-breaking provoke 
manifestations of Sprachgefuhl, but the relevant emotions and feelings 
can vary enormously, from irritation to choleric indignation, uneasiness 
and disgust. Ungrateful behaviour, like that of the boor, merits some 
negative emotion. But which? And is there only one such emotion in each 
case? 
The suggestion has been that for many a thick axiological predicate 
one or more type of emotional experience counts as the paradigmatic 
justifier of the application of the predicate, just as the bases of the 
emotional experience justify these. The relations of justification between 
emotions and applications of axiological predicates belong to what indi-
viduates possession of axiological concepts. In the case of one-one 
correlations between emotions and evaluative predicates, it seems 
plausible to claim that (dispositional) grasp of the predicate's representa-
tional (as opposed to its inferential) role involves just the transitions from 
the emotion to applicability of the predicate. But where the links are one-
many or many-one an account of possession of the relevant concept 
becomes much more complicated. 
§ 4 VALUE PROPERTIES 
If something like the above account of axiological concepts is 
correct, then perhaps it can be strengthened to yield an account of what it 
is for an evaluation to be true, what it is for something to possess a thick 
axiological property, without assuming with the naive realist that there are 
mind-independent monadic axiological properties. 
The first step is to provide an analysis of the notion of an appropri-
ate emotion making use of the notion, already introduced, of a justified 
emotion. Let x be an emotion whose base, b, is either a conceptual repre-
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sentation containing no axiological concept of a natural object, y, and of 
its natural properties, or a perceptual presentation of such an object. Let 
"justification" mean prima facie, non-inductive justification. Then, 
x is an emotion appropriate to y and its natural properties F-H iff (1) 
b is a true or veridical (re)presentation of y and of its properties F-H, 
and (2) b is justified if it is a conceptual representation of y (or fits y 
if it is a non-conceptual presentation of y), and (3) b justifies x, and 
(4) no relation of justification or fit mentioned is defeated. 
Three features of this account need to be highlighted. The emotional bases 
appealed to contain no axiological concepts. Secondly, appropriate 
emotions differ from justified emotions in that their bases correctly 
present or represent the natural world. Thus the account incorporates an 
element of correspondence. The type of correspondence involved is that 
favoured by internalist accounts of (re)presentation: the perceptual contents 
and the conceptual representations mentioned are such that they can be 
veridical or true and such that they can be non-veridical or false. But an 
externalist conception of correspondence is also compatible with the rest 
of the account (and is, I believe, preferable, at least for perception-based 
emotions, because "seeing something" is veridical and "seeing that" is 
factive, and for the semantic values of those emotion words, such as 
"regret," which behave in the same way).5 Finally, although the account 
applies only to the sort of conceptual representations found in beliefs and 
to perceptions such as simple seeings, it is not difficult to imagine how it 
might be extended to apply to both memory and anticipations. 
The second, by now unsurprising step is the biconditional: 
Something is valuable iff it is possible for it to be the object of an 
appropriate emotion. 
This is a mere schema. But where one-one links between emotions 
and thick value-predicates are available the schema is easily fleshed out 
y is dangerous iff fear of y is appropriate, 
y is contemptible iff contempt for y is appropriate, 
y is admirable iff admiration of y is appropriate, 
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y is better than z iff preference of y over z is appropriate, 
and so on. 
In order to counteract the impression that analyses of this type apply at 
best to the ethical and aesthetic spheres and, within these spheres, to cases 
where the emotion-value link is lexicographically guaranteed ('admire' -
admirable), consider the value of political legitimacy. Political institutions 
and systems are legitimate or not, or more-or-less legitimate. Like their 
members they are the object of varying degrees of confidence or trust; 
groups of people have confidence in them, believe in them, where this 
means more than any mere belief that, for example, belief that the insti-
tutions and their members are reliable in this or that respect. Confidence 
in and belief in are more than merely doxastic attitudes. They involve a 
variety of different affective attitudes: admiration, willingness to allow 
someone to represent you, even the affective relations involved in taking 
someone or an institution to be a model, exemplar or leader, and above all 
the absence of mistrust and of distrust (i.e., "confidence" and "belief in" 
often function as excluder-words). And they may be more or less justified. 
Understood in these terms, "confidence in" is a good candidate for the 
analysis of political legitimacy. For a political institution to be more-or-
less legitimate is for trust placed in it to be more-or-less appropriate.6 But 
this is an account of the value of political legitimacy. Those who are not 
impressed by the distinction between values and norms introduced above 
may endorse what, from the present perspective, can be described as a 
normative—and even procedural—account of legitimacy. By itself, this 
rules out the present account of legitimacy in terms of justified "confi-
dence in." An intermediate view would allow that beliefs about which 
procedures are (likely to be) followed belong to what justifies "confidence in." 
As we have seen, however, when we consider the full variety of 
value predicates and of emotions it becomes obvious that in very many 
cases there is not exactly one type of emotional response that can be used 
to give an account of a given axiological property. In all those cases where 
a neat biconditional is not available, that is, where the emotion-evaluative 
predicate link is not a one-one link, we may still maintain two strands in 
the above analysis. If something has a particular thick axiological property 
then there is some emotion appropriate to it and its purely natural proper-
ties. If some emotion is appropriate with respect to some object and its 
purely natural properties, then it has some thick axiological property. 
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What is the relation between the present account and the disposi-
tionalist account according to which to be positively valuable is to be 
likely to induce a positive emotional response? It is clearly possible to in-
corporate into our account the condition that an object, together with its 
natural properties, would or is likely to induce a certain emotional 
reaction. But there is a reason for thinking that a cognitivist account of 
evaluation should not incorporate such a clause. A datum that any such 
account of evaluation should take into account is the fact that emotional 
responses and evaluative language are continually being refined. In the 
realist's jargon, values are discovered, different types of value-blindness 
are corrected. Nietzsche did for the disvalue which is ressentiment what 
wine-growers regularly do for gustatory values. Any account of evalua-
tions which limits itself to the emotional dispositions (what in § 1 were 
called "sentiments") of actual individuals, or at least to their first-order 
emotional dispositions, will fail to do justice to this datum. 
There is, however, one class of emotion-value couples for which dis-
positionalism seems to provide an adequate analysis. Recall the 
distinction above between being boring, disgusting or fearful, on the one 
hand, and being admirable or hateful, on the other. Morphology is not 
always a reliable guide here—cf. "fearful" and "hateful"—and there are 
difficult cases, such as the property of being frightful. Similarly, it seems 
possible that "disgusting," for example, is sometimes used to ascribe to an 
object the property of being such that disgust would be appropriate. But 
in many cases "disgusting" and "fearful" do simply attribute the property 
of regularly provoking or being likely to provoke disgust or fear. For all 
the examples belonging to this limited diet the dispositionalist analysis 
seems to be appropriate. 
§ 5 OBJECTIONS 
[Wittgenstein] shook his head over it. The definition [of Ewing: 'Good is 
what it is right to admire'] throws no light. There are three concepts, all of 
them vague. Imagine three solid pieces of stone. You pick them up, fit them 
together and you get now a ball. What you've now got tells you something 
about the three shapes. Now consider you have three balls of or lumps of soft 
mud or putty—formless. Now you put the three together and mould out of 
them a ball. Ewing makes a soft ball out of three pieces of mud.7 
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Perhaps the two most obvious objections to the above account, in 
addition to the already-mentioned objections to many of its presupposi-
tions, are that it is, after all, contrary to the publicity, a naturalist theory 
and that, even if it is not a naturalist theory, it is circular. 
The naturalist fallacy is the identification of axiological and natural 
properties. Does not the present account make a similar sort of identifica-
tion? No. It accounts for axiological properties in terms of natural properties 
and properties which are neither natural nor axiological but belong to a 
third category, that of formal or topic-neutral properties.8 It is the formal 
relations of justification between emotions and their bases—perceptual 
contents and non-axiological beliefs—and between these bases and their 
justifiers which do all of the work in the present account. But, the objection 
continues, this is cheating. The relations of justification appealed to are 
not really a distinct component of the account. They are available to all 
the competing accounts, to the dispositionalist, to the naive realist and 
even to the emotivist. Internal relations supervene on contingent facts; they 
come for free. 
Suppose that internal relations do indeed supervene on external 
relations and on the possession by entities of monadic properties. It remains 
the case that the existence or obtaining of internal relations should not be 
confused with their being cognised. Now personal justification is essen-
tially something of which the subject is aware. Such awareness is 
certainly not expensive. But it does not come for free. And the varieties of 
justification appealed to in the analysis above are varieties of personal jus-
tification. Such personal phenomena as perceptions, emotions and beliefs 
stand in the justification relations employed in the present account of ap-
propriateness. And these are not to be confused with the terms of impersonal 
justification, truth-bearers such as sentences or propositions. 
Not only does the present account avoid the naturalist fallacy, it 
preserves an analogy with the most famous claim of such anti-naturalists 
as Moore, that goodness is indefinable. On the present account at least the 
thick value properties are analysable. But a mysterious simple does occur 
in the analysis: justification. 
The objection that the present account is circular is a natural enough 
objection. As Williams put is "The notions of appropriateness, correctness 
and so forth . . . cry out for examination; and they wear on their front the 
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fact that they are in some part evaluative."9 Wiggins concedes that the 
account he gives of appropriate emotions in the course of elaborating a 
"sensible subjectivism" is circular but "benignly" so since, amongst other 
things, his modification of traditional subjectivism is not part of the 
project of giving a full analysis of evaluative terms but part of the project 
of elucidating these.10 
Now there is clearly a close relation between 'appropriate' and such 
obviously evaluative terms as 'becoming', 'seemly', 'befitting', 'merits', 
even 'decorous' and 'decent'. Consider the related concept of desert as it 
occurs in the claim of the retributionist to the effect that certain deeds 
merit punishment or in the claim that a deed deserves a reward. These 
claims seem to mean that one sort of behaviour (or event: non-intentional 
reward or punishment) is appropriate to, is justified by, another sort of 
behaviour. But desert is equally clearly an evaluative notion. And, worse, 
it is often claimed that justification is a normative or evaluative concept. 
A first reply to this objection would be to concede the circularity but 
to point out that, if appropriateness and justification are indeed axiologi-
cal or normative notions, the relevant values or norms are cognitive values 
or norms. This would then make it possible to argue that the present 
account is an account of non-cognitive values in terms of cognitive values. 
There is, however, a more ambitious reply which can be made to the 
objection, a reply which involves rejecting the charge of circularity en 
bloc. As a first step towards this reply, it will be useful to consider just 
what sort of value or norm justification might be supposed to be. The 
following are putative platitudes in the domain of cognitive values and 
norms, if anything is: 
Justified beliefs are preferable to unjustified beliefs. 
Knowledge is valuable. 
Inconsistency is a bad thing. 
Sincerity is a good thing. 
One ought not to assert that p if one believes that not-p. 
One ought not to predicate " is a duck" of a rabbit in the 
context of a simple assertion 
Now is 'justifies' an axiological predicate? The examples just given 
suggest that although it is better for something to be justified than not, 
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being justified is not itself an axiological property, thick or thin. Consis-
tency and knowledge are good things although they are not values. (Since 
only the last two platitudes in the list refer to doables, only they express 
cognitive norms (cf. § 1 above). The question that really interests us is 
whether justification, which is not something directly subject to the will, 
is a cognitive value.) 
The suggestion that justification is not a cognitive value although it 
has a cognitive value may be illustrated by the following example. 
Suppose Sam's perception justifies his belief. The relation between his 
perception and his belief is not an axiological relation. But it may well be 
the case that it is better for his belief to be justified than not. 
The present suggestion concerns prima facie non-inductive justifica-
tion. It resembles the suggestion made by Frege (and somewhat later by 
Husserl) about another type of justification, deductive justification: 
Every law that states what is can be interpreted (aufgefasst) as prescribing 
that thinking ought to be in agreement with it and is therefore in this sense a 
law of thought (Frege, Grundgesetze 1893, XV) 
In other words, there are theoretical and normative formulations of logical 
rationality. The former, logical laws, are laws of being true, of what is 
true, the latter are laws about how we ought to think. Frege clearly held 
that the former are not only distinct from but also prior to the latter. The 
laws of being true are "authoritative (maassgebend, decisive) for our 
thinking, if it wants to attain truth" (XVI). Since the Tractatus it has often 
been thought that even if logic understood as an account of rules (inference, 
proof) does not wear the trousers with respect to logic as a semantic 
matter, nevertheless the latter can amount to no more than mere tautolo-
gies, that is, can have no theoretical content. But whether or not this is true 
of deductive relations, it is by no means obvious that it is true of other 
types of justification relations. (Pace the later Wittgenstein, for whom 
neither tautologies nor formulations of criterial relations have theoretical 
content, that is, a truth-value.) Certainly, in the case of the defeasible, non-
inductive transitions from perception to assertion, from perception to 
emotion and from emotion to evaluation there is even less temptation to 
hold on to Frege's Platonistic account of relations of justification than in 
the case of deductive rationality. 
If something like Frege's account of deductive rationality holds also 
for non-deductive rationality, if criterial connexions are like logical con-
sequence in being primarily theoretical connexions, then the account of 
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value presented here avoids one type of circularity. (Another accusation of 
circularity might focus on the role of true beliefs and veridical intention-
ality in the analysis given. In order to avoid this objection, the analysis is 
committed to the view that these relations are not normative. One ought 
not to assert duckhood of a rabbit, true, but that is because the concept 
duck does not apply to rabbits.) 
Of course, any extension of Frege's account would have to explain 
what it means to say that justification is a good thing. Frege himself, in the 
last quotation above, hints at how such an explanation might go. If our 
goal is truth—a better candidate might be: knowledge—then we ought to 
draw on logic. Similarly, we might add, we ought also to draw on the 
relations of defeasible justification. But the conditional should not be un-
derstood along the lines of common-or-garden hypothetical normative and 
axiological propositions. Validity and prima facie justification do not stand 
to truth or knowledge as most means stand to ends. They are essential parts 
of truth and knowledge. Utilitarianism, here as elsewhere, is not enough. 
§ 6 ADVANTAGES, LACUNAE AND DEVELOPMENTS 
Three Advantages 
One advantage of the present account is that in introducing justifica-
tion into the analysis of value in three of its four clauses it does justice to 
an indubitable feature of value-talk. If assertion of an evaluation involves 
claims about what justifies what, then since such claims refer to standards 
and paradigms, evaluations inherit the controversy value attaching to such 
references. And indeed we expect value talk to be contentious. Talk about 
generosity, priggishness and shoddiness nearly always provokes contro-
versy. The contrast with many empirical claims in ordinary language is 
striking: these should be justifiable but we do not normally expect our talk 
about the weather to be contested. Evaluative discourse, however, is es-
sentially contestable and contentious. This feature is, of course, one of the 
main motivations behind the desire to give a cognitivist account of evalu-
ative language. If evaluations are not truth bearers then our disagreements 
about evaluations become incomprehensible. Yet the two most influential 
forms of cognitivism, naive realism and dispositionalism, throw no light 
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on why evaluative claims are essentially contentious. Were they adequate 
analyses, talk about value and talk about the weather would be on a par. 
A second advantage of the role awarded by the present account to 
justification, one closely related to the first, is that it does justice to another 
widely acknowledged feature of value-talk. Most such talk involves 
attempts to educate—to refine, to correct, to broaden, to deepen, to render 
consistent—the responses of an interlocutor who is suspected of over-
looking, underestimating or simplifying this or that detail and so, too, of 
responses that are coarse, inadequate or blind. Aesthetic, ethical and 
political debate of any intensity invariably involves trying to get one's in-
terlocutor to see or describe a situation or a person in a certain way, to get 
him to feel in certain ways. In other words, it involves negotiating agree-
ments abut what evaluative predicates really mean and, simultaneously, 
negotiating agreement about their applicability. 
A third advantage of the present account stems from the connexion 
between motivation or justification and the role of signals. It is widely 
accepted that one central function of emotions is that of signaling or indi-
cating what has a positive or negative value in the niche or milieu of 
creatures, both human and non-human. This is closely bound up with the 
functions of steering or guiding behaviour and of expressing affective 
phenomena. These three functions belong to the much wider class of 
automatic transitions between emotion and behaviour, between perception 
and behaviour and between perception and emotion. Now the present 
account suggests how "fear signals danger" is to be understood: fear 
signals the possibility that it is appropriate. And it would be in the spirit 
of the present account to say that uses of evaluative predicates grow out 
of the primitive phenomena of steering, indicating, expression and, more 
generally, of automatic transitions. If motivation is a primitive form of 
justification, indication is a primitive form of motivation. 
Lacunae 
The account presented has been an account of those contingent eval-
uations which contain thick axiological predicates and which make predi-
cations of such entities as people, things, their traits and related episodes 
and actions. But this means that at least three important types of axiolog-
ical predication remain to be accounted for: 
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contingent predications of instrumental value or utility (example: that 
is useful); contingent predications containing attributive uses of "good" 
(examples: That is a good apple/text-book/wheeze); 
and 
axiological predications which, if true, are necessarily true (example: 
Pleasure is a good thing). 
Of these omissions, the last is the most serious, since the present 
analysis has actually appealed to such predications. I said that possession 
of a thick axiological property entails possession of such thin properties 
as being good. That a person or deed has a certain thick axiological property 
is a contingent matter, as is the possession of the natural properties un-
derlying the thick axiological property. That Sam's deed is courageous is 
contingently true. But the claim that whatever is courageous is good is not 
contingent. Such claims are sometimes said to involve predications of 
intrinsic value. Further examples are provided by such platitudes as 
Love is valuable. 
Knowledge is valuable. 
Pleasure is better than pain. 
Health is better than illness. 
It is better to be free than not. 
Love is better than pleasure. 
Cloth caps are better than baseball caps. 
Similarly, fashionable reversals of traditional platitudes also belong here. 
For example, the thesis of the great American Nietzschean, Mae West: 
It's not the men in your life that count. 
It's the life in your men. 
If we assume that the ultimate bearers of intrinsic value are always bio-
logical and psychological entities such as people, animals and their psy-
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etiological and vital traits, then there is one account available of attribu-
tions of intrinsic value which is close in spirit to the account given of 
contingent axiological predication. For love or pleasure to be good is for 
it to be the case that some positive emotion with respect to love or 
pleasure is justified. Clearly, the type of justification involved cannot be 
defeasible justification. Nor does the base of the positive emotion need to 
refer to anything but love or pleasure (or cases thereof, says the nominal-
ist). If (as Brentano suggested) there is an affective analogue of the 
self-evidence that is sometimes said to be enjoyed by a priori truths, then 
that would furnish one promising candidate. That love is valuable would 
then mean that love of love is self-evidently justified, or more vulgarly, 
that love is loveable. As Joyce's (Ulysses, "Cyclops") formulation, "Love 
loves to love love," indicates, this leads to a regress of sorts. But it is a regress 
as harmless as the regresses to which the concept of truth gives rise. 
Although the present account of evaluations presupposes a sharp dis-
tinction between values and norms, it is obvious what an analogous 
account of norms would look like: for a piece of behaviour to be what 
someone ought to do is for his intention to justify ("rationalise") the piece 
of behaviour. If, as suggested in § 1, emotions and motives (sentiments) 
underlie all intentions, then an account of what it means for an intention 
to justify an action will involve giving an account of how the underlying 
emotions and sentiments justify the intention. The simplicity and monotony 
of desires and intentions—which vary only in their objects, contents and 
intensity—does indeed contrast sharply with the variety of emotions. But 
justification of behaviour inherits all the complexity of justification of 
emotions (whether or not justification is transitive). 
Response-dependence vs. Realist verificationism 
The account in § 3 of the meaning of axiological concepts is in the 
spirit of a number of contemporary programmes—accounts of meaning in 
terms of assertibility conditions, criteria, functional roles and, in particu-
lar, of response-dependence accounts of a variety of concepts. The main 
difference concerns the central role attributed to non-inductive, non-doxastic, 
prima facie justification in the present account. 
Response-dependence theories are theories of concepts. For a con-
ceptualist the step from a theory of concepts to a theory of properties is a 
small one. So it is, too, for a philosopher who dispenses with senses and 
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contents understood as modes of presentation and allows only attitudes, 
sentences and singular propositions. For a realist who allows for senses 
and contents as well as a theory of properties, a theory of truth makers is 
one thing, a theory of content and sense another quite distinct, albeit in-
separable, matter.11 
The concerns of response-dependence theorists and of such a realist 
meet in realist verificationism. Verificationisms can be classified by the 
type of theory of perception they espouse. This yields the verificationism 
of the direct realist (of direct realists who do and those who do not allow 
for content), of the indirect or critical realist, and of the phenomenalist. 
The distinction between friends and enemies of simple seeing is skew to 
this classification. Largely skew to both of these classifications is the dis-
tinction between verificationisms which are realist and those which are 
anti-realist about bivalence. Viennese verificationisms involved either 
phenomenalism or critical realism but were not explicitly anti-realist about 
bivalence. Dummett's verificationism is anti-realist and directly realist 
about perception but makes visual perception out to involve something in-
termediate between simple seeing and epistemic seeing ("proto-thoughts"). 
What, it may be wondered, is realist verificationism? 
For the really realist verificationist bivalence rules and perceptual 
verification is direct, non-conceptual and of mind-independent particulars. 
An expression is propositionally meaningful iff it is true or false. " is 
true" is a derelativised predicate. For something to be true is for there to 
be something which makes it true. Then, for the most basic types of 
atomic, ordinary language predications, 
a makes p true iff (1) a exists, and (2) p, and (3) it is possible that 
there is a perception which is of a and fits a, and (4) this percep-
tion defeasibly and non-inductively justifies p. 
In other words, the truth-maker relation is to be explained in terms 
of possible perceptual verification.12 Here it is important that the percep-
tion referred to be non-conceptual. Otherwise meanings would be 
imported into the account of meaningfulness and the latter would be 
circular. Now such an account will not work for all types of atomic, 
ordinary language predications. It will not work for social predicates 
("teacher," "entrepreneur") since these are not perceptually verifiable. (It 
is often thought that it cannot work for simple dispositional predicates.) 
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Nor will it work for value predicates, for the same reason. But the se-
mantics of evaluations given in § 4 can now be seen as an extension of the 
central strategy employed by realistic verificationism. The extension 
involves putting emotions to work in the same way in which perceptions 
function in the verificationist account of meaning. Just as perceptions 
justify applications of natural predicates so, too, emotions—together with 
their perceptual and doxastic but non-evaluative bases—justify the appli-
cation of evaluative predicates. 
In anti-realist verificationisms, the perceptual possibilities and, more 
generally, the assertibility-conditions appealed to, are relative to subjects 
or communities. This is often what generates their anti-realist commit-
ments. Similarly, in dispositionalist accounts of evaluations (and of colour 
talk) the dispositions appealed to are first-order possibilities and likeli-
hoods open to natural objects and subjects or communities. But the 
possible perceptions to which the realist verificationist appeals are not so 
relativised. Nor are the possible emotions invoked in § 4. It is not impos-
sible that an intermediate type of possibility, for example that peculiar to 
second-order dispositional properties (or indeed a new theory of the 
relation between modality and time), might turn out to yield an account of 
evaluations and other types of predication more appropriate than the 
accounts yielded by either of these two modal extremes.13 
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12. On the truth-maker relation analysed here, cf. Mulligan, Simons and Smith 1984. 
13. The history of appeals to appropriate emotions and to defeasible justification in 
Austrian philosophy—from Brentano and Meinong to Musil and Wittgenstein—and 
before that in Celtic philosophy—in Hutcheson and Reid—and in analytic philosophy— 
from Broad and Ewing to Wiggins—is a complicated one I hope to deal with elsewhere. 
Within analytic philosophy it is widely accepted that any account of evaluations and values 
must explain how these motivate action. Within Austrian philosophy a common reply to 
this challenge has it that all ethical values are, or are closely connected to, aesthetic values. 
Thus it is the emotional responses to aesthetic values which motivate ethical agents. 
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